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ABSTrAcT 
Feminist philosophy has taken too long to engage seriously with aesthetics 
and has been even slower in confronting natural beauty in particular. There 
are various possible reasons for this neglect, including the relative youth of 
feminist aesthetics, the possibility that feminist philosophy is not relevant 
to nature aesthetics, the claim that natural beauty is not a serious topic, 
hesitation among feminists to perpetuate women’s associations with beauty 
and nature, and that the neglect may be merely apparent. Discussing each 
of these possibilities affords a better understanding of, but none justify the 
neglect of natural beauty in feminist aesthetics. 
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i.
in 1966, ronald Hepburn brought our attention to the neglect of natural 
beauty in contemporary aesthetics in his influential essay, ‘contemporary 
Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty’.2 in it Hepburn not only 
notes the neglect of natural beauty in contemporary aesthetics, but also 
diagnoses its causes, bemoans its negative consequences, and discusses the 
positive effects that might follow from taking natural beauty seriously as a 
philosophical topic. Now, half a century later, natural beauty is given much 
more careful and frequent attention in philosophical aesthetics, largely due 
to Hepburn’s work, and it is no longer the case that most major anthologies 
of aesthetics fail to include any work on natural beauty. of course, this is 
not to say that environmental aesthetics is as centrally located as it ought to 
be in philosophical aesthetics; alas, to too many philosophers it seems the 
field of aesthetics is still defined as ‘the philosophy of art’ or ‘philosophy 
of criticism’. 
examples of recent anthologies that omit environmental aesthetics as a 
topic are easy to come by and include Aesthetics: The Big Questions, edited 
by carolyn Korsmeyer (Wiley, 1998) and Contemporary Debates in Aesthet-
ics and the Philosophy of Art edited by Mathew Kieran (Wiley-Blackwell, 
2005). yet, there is still cause for celebration and optimism, for despite some 
continued neglect, many contemporary aestheticians appreciate the theoretical 
and practical seriousness of the topic of natural beauty, as is evidenced by 
recent aesthetics anthologies that do include studies of natural beauty and 
other areas of interest to environmental aestheticians, including Aesthetics, 
edited by Susan l. Feagin and Patrick Maynard (oxford, 1998); Aesthetics 
and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition: An Anthology, edited by 
Peter lamarque and Stein Haugom olsen (Wiley, 2003); and Arguing About 
Art, 3rd edition, edited by Alex Neill and Aaron ridley (routledge, 2004).3 
in addition, several single-authored texts devote some attention to environ-
mental aesthetics and natural beauty. For example, roger Scruton’s recent 
book Beauty (oxford, 2009) includes a chapter on natural beauty; Thomas 
Heyd’s Encountering Nature: Toward an Environmental Culture (Ashgate, 
2007) deals with important issues in nature appreciation and environmental 
art; and Noël carroll’s collected essays in Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical 
Essays (cambridge, 2001) include two pieces on nature appreciation in the 
section entitled ‘Alternative Topics’. 
There are also numerous anthologies and single-authored texts today that 
deal primarily, even exclusively, with environmental aesthetics and natural 
beauty. The first half of carlson’s Aesthetics and the Environment (routledge, 
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2002) is devoted to natural beauty and related topics. (of course, this is no 
surprise as he is the philosopher responsible for authoring the dominant 
model of nature appreciation with which the rest of us continue to contend.) 
To name just a few more single-authored texts on natural beauty, there are: 
ronald Moore’s Natural Beauty (oxford, 2008); Glenn Parsons and Allen 
carlson’s Functional Beauty (oxford, 2008); emily Brady’s Aesthetics of the 
Natural Environment (edinburgh University Press, 2003); Arnold Berleant’s 
Aesthetics and Environment: Variations on a Theme (Ashgate, 2005) and his 
earlier The Aesthetics of Environment (Temple, 1992); and yrjö Sepänmaa’s 
The Beauty of Environment: A General Model for Environmental Aesthetics 
(environmental ethics Books, 1993). indeed the field of environmental aes-
thetics is a thriving subdiscipline in aesthetics today and increased attention 
is being given to natural beauty, which is, of course, good news. 
ii.
However, although philosophical attention to natural beauty has increased 
dramatically since Hepburn wrote his groundbreaking essay, natural beauty 
continues to be neglected in another area of philosophy: feminist philosophy. 
Scanning contemporary texts in environmental aesthetics one finds treatments 
of issues bringing science, art, epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, environ-
mentalism, religion, pragmatism, history, politics and existentialism to bear 
on natural beauty and other issues in environmental aesthetics. What one does 
not find are feminist studies in natural beauty and environmental aesthetics. 
interestingly, when feminist philosophers do confront environmental aesthet-
ics, they are much more inclined to discuss the sublime than the beautiful. 
This is undoubtedly due to the gendered history of the sublime, as many 
philosophers have explicitly argued or implicitly assumed that women are 
less able or unable to fully appreciate the sublime. Given the association of 
the sublime with intelligence, culture, freedom and strength, analysing the 
gendered assumptions that underwrite the conviction that women are not 
well-suited to appreciate the sublime is certainly a very worthwhile project. 
on the other hand, women have always been associated with the beautiful 
and with nature, and usually not in welcome ways. in fact, feminists have 
worked hard to undermine these associations. 
A quick survey of some representative environmental aesthetics texts 
makes the point. Arnold Berleant and Allen carlson’s The Aesthetics of 
Natural Environments (Broadview, 2004) and carlson and lintott’s Aes-
thetics, Nature, and Environmentalism: From Beauty to Duty (columbia, 
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2008) contain no studies of feminist aesthetics; indeed, the word ‘feminist’ 
doesn’t appear in either book’s index. As for single-authored texts, none of 
the texts mentioned above make sustained inquiry into feminist aesthetics 
or into what the field of feminist philosophy might disclose about environ-
mental aesthetics. 
The neglect i am worried about is evidenced not only in environmental 
aesthetics texts but also in feminist philosophy texts, for feminist philosophers 
also fail to deal sufficiently with natural beauty in their venues. Another 
quick survey makes the point. Despite publishing three relevant special is-
sues, one on ‘Feminist Aesthetics’ edited by carolyn Korsmeyer and Hilde 
Hein in the summer of 1990 with a subsequent text entitled Aesthetics in a 
Feminist Perspective (indiana University Press, 1993), another on ‘Women, 
Art, and Aesthetics’ edited by Peg Brand and Mary Devereaux in the autumn 
of 2003, and one more on ‘ecological Feminism’ edited by Karen Warren 
in the spring of 1991, Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy has yet to 
publish any articles on natural beauty or even environmental aesthetics more 
generally since its start in 1983. Neither does the ‘Feminism and Traditional 
Aesthetics’ special issue Peg Brand and carolyn Korsmeyer edited of The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism (48:4) in 1990 or the subsequent 
text based on it published by Penn State University Press in 1995 include 
any work on environmental aesthetics. 
Books in feminist aesthetics follow this same trend. carolyn Kors-
meyer’s Gender and Aesthetics: An Introduction (routledge, 2005) does 
not discuss natural beauty, focusing primarily on issues in the philosophy 
of art, the politics of aesthetic taste and the practice of art, and the gendered 
sublime. Peg Brand’s edited text, Beauty Matters (indiana University Press, 
2000) contains no discussion of natural beauty, neither, i believe, does her 
forthcoming Beauty Revisited (forthcoming from indiana University Press). 
ryan Musgrave’s forthcoming volume, Feminist Aesthetics and Philosophy 
of Art: The Power of Critical Visions and Creative Engagement (Springer) 
includes two feminist essays in environmental aesthetics, but these are on 
the sublime and artistic representation, not beauty.
Feminist aestheticians are doing important work, grappling with social, 
political and ethical issues in the philosophy of art, but they have yet to 
arrive at a full engagement with environmental aesthetics. environmental 
aestheticians are likewise doing important work as they confront aesthetic 
issues at the intersection of theory and practice in philosophical matters that 
are purely aesthetic and also those that are metaphysical, ethical and political. 
environmental aestheticians have yet to explore feminist philosophy in detail 
and feminist philosophers have yet to explore fully explore environmental 
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aesthetics, in particular, natural beauty. of course, not all philosophers are 
competent to discuss feminist aesthetics and it is to their credit that they do 
not simply appropriate piecemeal what might sound fashionable in order to 
appear more inclusive and interesting; however, this point raises two other 
issues: why aren’t more aestheticians competent in feminist philosophy 
and why aren’t those who are competent in feminist philosophy exploring 
environmental aesthetics, especially natural beauty? 
iii.
Feminist philosophy has taken too long to engage seriously with aesthet-
ics and it has been even slower in confronting environmental aesthetics in 
general and natural beauty in particular. Having duly noted the neglect of 
natural beauty from a feminist perspective, it is worth our time to consider 
some reasons that might explain why feminist aesthetics does not focus, at 
least sometimes, wholly and deeply on natural beauty. There are a number of 
possible explanations worth considering. The fact that feminist aesthetics is 
a relatively new field of inquiry probably offers a partial explanation of the 
lack of attention to nature aesthetics. other possibilities worth considering 
are whether feminist philosophy may not be relevant to nature aesthetics 
and whether natural beauty may not be a sufficiently serious topic for femi-
nists. Perhaps feminists are leery about associations with beauty and with 
nature due to the damage beauty ideals have done to women over the ages 
and because the history of women’s subordination is tied to their associa-
tions with nature. Another possibility is that the neglect is merely apparent 
and feminist work has been done in the field of environmental aesthetics 
although without being explicitly named as such. As we shall see, although 
each functions as a partial explanation of it, none of these reasons justifies 
the neglect of natural beauty in feminist aesthetics. 
The most obvious answer to the question of why feminist aesthetics has 
neglected natural beauty thus far goes a long way towards explaining the 
neglect: the neglect may be largely due to feminist aesthetics’ relative youth 
as a discipline and the related groundwork of the field that has been being 
laid over the last twenty years, groundwork that might have been or seemed 
to be conceptually necessary for inquiries such as those into environmental 
aesthetics. For reasons that aren’t entirely clear, aesthetics and philosophy 
of art have been late to embrace feminist thought. in their introduction to 
the special volume of Hypatia on ‘Feminist Aesthetics’ in 1990, Hein and 
Korsmeyer reflect on this strange phenomenon: 
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one might expect that the ‘hard core’ of philosophy that includes metaphys-
ics, epistemology, and philosophy of science would be the most resistant 
to feminist incursion, but a powerful feminist critique has made an impact 
in these areas over the past decade. in other disciplines, particularly those 
cognate to aesthetics – literature, art history, film theory – feminist perspec-
tives have achieved almost mainstream respectability. The relative lack of a 
feminist presence in philosophical aesthetics is therefore puzzling.4
More than a decade later, in the introduction to their special issue of 
Hypatia on ‘Women, Art, and Aesthetics’, Peg Brand and Mary Devereaux 
remark on how early work in feminist aesthetics ‘directed philosophic at-
tention for the first time to women’s experiences, including women’s experi-
ences of their own bodies and their sense of themselves as creators’.5 As is 
frequent when feminist thought is first brought to bear on an area of inquiry, 
the initial work in feminist aesthetics focused on rectifying the history and 
making the field – in its subject matter and its practice – more inclusive of 
women and others who have been sidelined through the history. As Hein 
and Korsmeyer put it:
Typically, the process begins with the discovery by women who would be 
practitioners in a field that women are not only absent but excluded from 
that field, whether as participants, subjects, or intended audience. Frustrated 
by this absence, the first impulse of many feminists has been to rectify it 
by inclusion. With diligent scholarship and creative resifting of evidence, 
they have found forgotten female writers, artists, scientists, and scholars and 
given them a place within the conventional canon. Hundreds of ‘lost’ women 
have been reclaimed in this fashion in a movement parallel to that initiated 
by other ‘marginal’ groups who are likewise seeking a legitimate place in 
the annals of history. Feminist aestheticians are thus joining an enquiry that 
has already established the need to discover and justify women artists and is 
now facing the analytic task of making clear the grounds for their inclusion.6
So we see that one reason feminist aesthetics has yet to deal adequately with 
environmental aesthetics might have to do with the other work, work that 
was or understandably seemed foundational, that has been its focus since 
the 1990s. The fact that the feminist artworld was a strong source of crea-
tivity and activism decades before aestheticians fully embraced feminism 
in their philosophical work also likely made a focus on art more obvious 
to feminist thinkers. 
To some, it probably seems that the reason we have yet to find thorough 
feminist investigations of natural beauty is that such an investigation will 
not disclose anything new about natural beauty or environmental aesthet-
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ics. in short, maybe feminist philosophy is not relevant to environmental 
aesthetics. Some may believe environmental aesthetics is really a gender-
neutral discipline, as it studies nature, not art. The presumption here is that 
whereas art is a cultural enterprise, created, controlled and appreciated by 
people enmeshed in various power relations and systems of domination, it is 
appropriately analysed for the various gendered meanings and implications 
that its process, practice and objects might produce and perpetuate, nature is 
not human-created or human-controlled, but merely human-discovered and 
thus is not laden with such cultural, including gendered, baggage. Nature, 
on this view, is gender neutral. What, therefore, can feminist philosophy 
disclose about nature aesthetics that traditional philosophy is likely to miss? 
Such seeming gender neutrality, however, is an illusion. And faith in 
that illusion slowed philosophy’s progress into feminist theory as well. As 
Brand and Korsmeyer note, ‘philosophy, initially seeming the most “neu-
tral” of disciplines with regard to its significance for gender difference, has 
an entire new area of studies that reexamines this presumption, revealing 
deep seated gender dimensions in such basic concepts as rationality and 
autonomy’.7 it now seems obvious that there are gendered aspects to these 
and other basic concepts that once seemed wholly gender neutral and 
many of these, including rationality and autonomy, are relevant to studies 
of natural beauty. Moreover, although we might conceive of nature as that 
which is neither intentionally created nor wholly controlled by humans, we 
should be cognisant of the fact that the manner and mode through which 
we discover, categorise and even aesthetically respond to things involves 
gendered (and other cultural) lenses and might be skewed by the workings 
of ideologies that privilege certain perspectives (e.g., white male). The two 
main notions in environmental aesthetics are ripe for gender analysis from 
a feminist perspective: the conceptions of nature and beauty, for both are 
gendered concepts with varied gendered associations. in addition, gender 
analysis of the concepts and relations among scientific knowledge, objectivity, 
appreciation, appropriate appreciation and taste, just to name a few, would 
be relevant to philosophical investigation into the aesthetic appreciation of 
nature. The belief that environmental aesthetics is a gender-neutral field 
conveys a naivety and, frankly, an embarrassing ignorance of what feminist 
philosophy has accomplished in other areas of philosophy.
on the other hand, some feminist philosophers might argue natural beauty 
is not a topic of sufficient importance to divert feminist attention from other 
matters. Feminist philosophers strive for gender equality and fight domina-
tion in all of its forms. it might seem that natural beauty is merely a nicety 
that, although pleasant, is little more than that and hence should not divert 
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feminists from the more important tasks that occupy their time and energy. 
However, as much recent feminist scholarship shows, realms of value are 
not neatly divisible from one another, but inform and help construct one 
another. Just as we are aware of how intersections between gender, race and 
class, for example, affect an individual’s experiences under patriarchy, we 
should be aware that aesthetic, ethical, social and political values affect and 
help determine one another. if so, then aesthetic value is one more part of 
the picture that needs to be studied in any attempt to create a more equitable 
and just world, including the human-to-nature community. 
As yrjö Sepänmaa points out, judging beauty and aesthetics as nothing 
more than ‘high cultural icing’ is an error and a very regrettable one at that, 
for aesthetics concerns largely what it means to live a good life.8 i believe 
that the marginalisation of aesthetics within philosophy is due to this error 
as well and that if philosophers reflected on their own lives and what matters 
to them in it, they too might realise and investigate the importance of aes-
thetics, natural and cultural, even if the two are not neatly divisible. Neither 
aesthetics generally, nor beauty more specifically, is accurately portrayed 
as trivial. Kathleen Higgins argues persuasively that beauty is undervalued 
today because it is commonly confused with its ‘kitsch competitors’. in her 
discussion which focuses on human beauty, she says, ‘false paradigms of 
beauty have obscured the fact that human beauty manifests an ideal of bal-
ance and health that is neither self-conscious nor a consequence of deliber-
ate effort’. This ideal, not the false paradigms of glamour and flawlessness, 
Higgins argues, is relevant ‘to our personal and cultural well-being’.9 
Hepburn too reflects on the seriousness with which we can attend to 
natural beauty in his ‘Trivial and Serious in Aesthetic Appreciation of Na-
ture’. Worrying about how natural beauty might stand (or fall) against the 
‘competing and vociferously promoted values involved in industry, com-
merce and urban expansion’, Hepburn advocates a wide sense of beauty, 
as including ‘the aesthetically arresting, the rewarding-to-contemplation, 
a great range of emotional qualities, without necessarily being pleasurable 
or lovable or suggestive of some ideal’.10 Moreover, he maintains that the 
way we attend to nature aesthetically can be more or less serious, with the 
serious end of the spectrum involving, necessarily, self-exploration: ‘for the 
energies, regularities, contingencies of nature are the energies, principles and 
contingencies that sustain my one embodied life and my own awareness’.11 
But one might still wonder what feminist theory has to gain by consider-
ing natural beauty. in addition to the importance of inquiring on our own 
terms into an aspect of life that contributes to its value, feminist theory’s 
commitment to the importance of experience, including perceptual and 
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sensual experience, can be better informed by investigation into experi-
ences, evaluations, and descriptions of natural beauty. in a discussion of the 
feminist background of care ethics, Virginia Held conveys the importance 
of experience, including sensual experience, to feminism: 
Feminism is a revolutionary movement. it aims to overturn what many 
consider the most entrenched hierarchy there is: the hierarchy of gender … 
experience is central to feminist thought, but what is meant by experience 
is not mere empirical observation, as so much of the history of modern 
philosophy and as analytic philosophy tend to construe it. Feminist experi-
ence is what art and literature as well as science deal with. it is the lived 
experience of feeling as well as thinking, of performing actions as well as 
receiving impressions, and of being aware of our connections with other 
people as well as of our own sensations.12
Given the ubiquity of first-hand nature encounters and accounts of nature 
encounters, including many by women, in such places as diaries, memoirs 
and professional nature-writing, thinking about natural beauty from a feminist 
perspective can enrich a feminist take on experience. Being aware of and 
philosophically reflecting on our sensations among others, without others, 
within nature, and outside of nature, will better ground any feminist account 
of the importance and nature of lived experience. 
This line of thought is reminiscent of the hierarchical placement of art 
over that of nature in much aesthetic thought. Maybe we were, maybe still 
are, convinced of the Hegelian idea that art trumps nature in aesthetic and 
philosophical importance. As Hepburn notes in his study of contemporary 
neglect, the philosophical world of aesthetics when he was writing was 
dominated by an exclusive concern about art in the mid-twentieth century. 
Today the field of aesthetics has a wider breadth of interest, although the 
‘centre’ still holds onto traditional questions of art’s nature and art’s value. 
Feminist philosophy is admittedly and intentionally radically different from 
traditional philosophy, but it still reacts to and is informed by the tradition. it 
shouldn’t be terribly surprising if the topics of interest to feminist aestheti-
cians should develop and evolve in a similar pattern as did those of interest 
to traditional philosophical aestheticians. And this is likely be due to similar 
causes, such as a twentieth-century philosophical penchant for conceptual 
analysis (and the related focus on the definitional project of saying precisely 
what art is), the dominance of certain theories of art and standards of aesthetic 
excellence, such as expressionism (which, as Hepburn points out, doesn’t 
transfer well to nature appreciation) and formalism (which doesn’t sit well 
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with many feminists), and a seeming demystification of nature through sci-
ence and technology. 
in addition to this philosophical parity of process, there are unique factors 
influencing the development of feminist aesthetics. christine Battersby, a 
feminist philosophical aesthetician who attends to environmental aesthet-
ics to the extent that her work on the sublime has obvious implications for 
environmental aesthetics, examines the hostility to feminist aesthetics found 
in philosophy and in the artworld. like Hein and Korsmeyer, she too notes 
the puzzling nature of the lagging behind of aesthetics when it comes to fully 
embracing feminism, noting that given the many debates about the relation-
ship between women and aesthetics, ‘it is, therefore, ironic that although 
the present-day opponents of feminism have been able to grasp that there 
might be a place for feminist ethics or feminist political theory within the 
discipline of philosophy, the notion of feminist aesthetics has been found 
much more baffling and has attracted opposition, even from within feminism 
itself’.13 She argues that this hostility is partly due to the influence of Kant 
and his insistence that aesthetic judgments should be wholly disinterested, 
that aesthetic judgment ‘must abstract from all use value and material value’ 
which doesn’t sit well with feminist commitments.14 
indeed, much work in feminist aesthetics has been devoted to questioning 
the ideal of disinterestedness and related artistic standards, to arguing that 
it is unattainable, and to insisting that it in fact serves various interests of 
patriarchy and other related power systems. So, although the disinterested 
requirement doesn’t usually sit well with feminist commitments, it has cap-
tured the critical attention of aestheticians. Admittedly, most of this attention 
has been on the norm of disinterestedness as it functions in art appreciation, 
but environmental aestheticians have called the ideal of disinterestedness in 
nature appreciation into question as well. critiques of disinterestedness in 
environmental aesthetics frequently rely on or incorporate feminist insights; 
thus, they can serve as models for making further inroads into feminist 
environmental aesthetics. 
The irony Battersby remarks on returns us to something i mentioned at the 
outset of this essay and offers a clue to another reason aesthetics has lagged 
behind other areas in philosophy in embracing feminism (and feminism in 
coming to seriously confront aesthetics): this is the too frequent association 
of women with the beautiful, and the attendant undervaluing of women for 
this association. Feminist philosophers have scrutinised various beauty ide-
als and beauty myths, studying, in particular, their gendered natures and the 
gender biases behind them. Given the burden that beauty places on women 
it is understandable that feminist philosophers have focused on critiquing 
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beauty rather than on celebrating it, whether in art, the body or nature. 
After all, feminist philosophers have worked very hard to help women to 
be seen as, well, to be more than seen – to be disassociated from beauty, 
to be freed from beauty ideals. Given that aesthetics is typically related to 
pleasure and mistakenly only with trivial, idiosyncratically subjective and 
base pleasures, the feminist hostility to aesthetics as a discipline is, again, 
not terribly surprising. 
Although it’s not terribly surprising, it’s also not adequately justified. 
Feminist aestheticians have not shied away from critiquing sexist and racist 
conceptions of beauty, nor have they stopped short of celebrating healthier, 
more inclusive, and life-affirming conceptions of human beauty. examples 
of such critiques and celebrations can be found in much of the feminist 
literature mentioned above. in fact, much feminist discourse has to do with 
redefining the relationships, roles, ideals and expectations to which women 
are held; consider, for example, feminist critiques of heteronormativity, 
motherhood, body ideals, genius, and the so-called feminine virtues. re-
examining these matters allows feminists to include women’s and other 
marginalised groups’ voices in the debate. As i indicated above, the way we 
understand natural beauty has normative force in economic, ethical, social 
and political debates and is influenced by such debates. Feminists should 
be part of those dialogues. 
Most persuasively, the neglect of natural beauty in feminist aesthetics can 
be partly attributed to feminist ambivalence toward nature. Bonnie Mann 
provocatively begins her essay ‘What Should Feminists do about Nature?’ 
with the following diagnosis: 
‘Nature’ is the historical millstone hung around the necks of women. it is 
not only such stone, but it has been the heaviest and the most securely tied. 
if we understand feminism to be first a social movement for the emancipa-
tion of women, then we recognize that the question of nature has been the 
central question for feminism because the question of nature is the question 
of freedom for women.15 
Mann claims that the historical and political problem feminists have with 
nature, a problem that results from an awareness that ‘nature’ has been 
hung around women’s necks for millennia, prescribing answers to us for 
the great questions, telling us just what we can know, just how what we 
should act, and even for just what we may reasonably hope,16 is so intense 
that it completely distracts us from the other major problem feminist have 
with nature, the one all living creatures have with nature. Mann calls this 
the ontological problem of nature, and, following Arendt following Marx, 
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‘our metabolism with the earth’.17 We cannot avoid confronting the problem 
of nature in this sense, for we are part of nature and nature is part of us. 
Distraction from the ontological problem of nature, she says, ‘results in the 
persistent ghettoization of feminist thinking about nature around the ques-
tion of sexual difference’.18
‘Nature’ has many senses to a feminist (to anyone, really), and not all 
are feminist-friendly. As Mann points out, feminists attend to how nature is 
frequently invoked in conservative attempts to justify the status quo, as in 
‘nature made women nurturing, so they should stay home with the children’, 
or lawrence Summers’ remarks that innate differences in ability and interest 
between men and women might help explain, in part, the inequity we find 
among men and women in science and mathematics.19 Appeals to nature are 
likewise made in descriptions of bad behaviour, descriptions that sometimes 
bleed over into justifications, as, for example, we find in the popular explana-
tions of male sexual aggression on the basis of evolution critically analysed 
in Martha Mccaughey’s recent book, The Caveman Mystique (2007). 
Feminists often question dualisms, such as, and most forcefully, that 
between nature and culture, upon which it might seem much environmental 
aesthetics and studies of natural beauty rest, and the historical association 
of women with nature. yet, as Mann argues, the problems nature confronts 
a feminist with cannot be separated. We must do something about nature 
because we are ontologically tied to it; while we must also be aware and 
critical of the associations of women with nature and men with culture. Just 
as women have been burdened with beauty requirements and it is therefore 
reasonable to see feminist resistance to celebrations of beauty, women’s sub-
ordination has frequently been justified by their association with nature and 
it is therefore reasonable to see feminist resistance to celebrations of nature. 
For this reason, some may think a feminist study of nature aesthetics can 
only follow a well thought out critique of the relationships between women 
and nature and an evaluation of the extent to which women should accept, 
reject, transform or celebrate these relationships. And this very debate rages 
on among ecofeminists and within feminism more generally. The dualism 
of nature and culture and the association of women with nature has been a 
focus of feminists; none the less, feminists have yet, in my opinion, come 
to terms with the relative importance of environmental aesthetics in under-
standing and critiquing this dualism and this association. Moreover, if Mann 
is correct, feminists can’t hope to solve the historical and political problem 
of women’s association of nature without paying mind to the nature of and 
proper response to the ontological problem of nature; aesthetics must play 
a role in this solution. in other words, a feminist study of nature aesthetics 
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must not only be informed by but also inform a well thought out critique 
of the relationships between women and nature and an evaluation of the 
extent to which women should accept, reject, transform or celebrate these 
relationships. Given that lived experience and not merely abstract reasoning 
is the groundwork of much feminist thought, an account of the ontological 
relationship with nature would be pale and weak without attending to the 
aesthetic relationships between us and nature. 
on a final and important note, to some it might seem that the neglect of 
natural beauty by feminist aestheticians is merely apparent, as there already 
is feminist work in this area, although it is not explicitly labelled as such. 
However, due to a lack of a specific, although not necessarily exclusive, focus 
on women, the work appealed to is usually not feminist. For example, Aldo 
leopold was an environmental thinker who was deeply worried about various 
forms of domination involved with the human to nature relationship. i think 
any feminist who is critical of liberal individualistic ideology, and many of 
us are, would find deep resonance with leopold’s thoughts on interdepend-
ence and the importance of relationships between and among humans and 
the natural environment. in a movement that feminists can respect, leopold 
insisted that human beings should take a new position, that captured by the 
notion of a land ethic, relative to nature: ‘a land ethic changes the role of 
Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and 
citizen of it’.20 in a movement that environmental aestheticians can respect, 
leopold prioritises aesthetics in environmentalism with his definition of a 
right act: ‘a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, 
and beauty of the biotic community’21 (emphasis mine). Any environmental 
aesthetician who wants to underscore the importance of aesthetic value, 
and many of us do, can find deep resonance with leopold’s inclusion of 
beauty in the cluster of things that should be considered for contributing to 
rightness or goodness.
Despite many important feminist and aesthetic themes detectable in 
aspects of leopold’s thought, i am not willing to consider him a feminist 
aesthetician, nor even a feminist philosopher. This is not due to his gender, 
but because leopold does not work with a conscious focus on women and 
gender norms, nor with an explicit commitment to feminist thought and to 
advancing feminist perspectives. i am not faulting him for this; my judg-
ment here is merely descriptive. Nor am i denying that his work offers much 
that feminists might find of value. one can accomplish much that furthers a 
movement without being part of that movement. yet, feminist philosophy is 
a bona fide sub-discipline in philosophy and just as one is unlikely, without 
studying the field, to unintentionally make major contributions to analytic 
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philosophy of mind, one is unlikely to make major contributions to feminist 
philosophy without relevant study and intentionality. Nonetheless, i would 
consider leopold a proto-feminist. 
Unlike when leopold was working, today feminist philosophy is a well-
established field and yet is still not one that a philosopher can partake in 
inadvertently. of course, the work of some philosophers is more amenable to 
feminist appropriations and more sensitive to the implications of patriarchy 
and gender norms than is that of others. Some aestheticians have incorporated 
feminist insights into their work, but frequently where one does find treatment 
of feminist and environmental aesthetics in the same text, the analyses often 
fail to fully inform one another. For example, in her recent book, Everyday 
Aesthetics, environmental aesthetician yuriko Saito writes that her approach 
might rightly be considered feminist as her focus is ‘the often neglected aspect 
of our aesthetic life, just as feminist philosophy takes up aspects of our lives 
that have traditionally been ignored in a serious academic discourse due to 
their ordinary and mundane nature, such as domestic chores and mothering 
activities, generally relegated to the female domain’.22 While she does make 
some interesting connections to feminist issues in her text, Saito does not 
thoroughly mine the depths of feminist thought that might be relevant to 
her project and stops short of aligning her approach with a feminist, or with 
any, agenda. Glenn Parsons and Allen carlson discuss feminist aesthetics 
in passing in their recent Functional Beauty. emily Brady’s Aesthetics of 
the Natural Environment makes passing mention of feminist aesthetics in 
the context of defending a conception of disinterestedness, but the book 
does not include a sustained study of feminist aesthetics. elaine Scarry’s 
On Beauty and Being Just deals promisingly with natural beauty but does 
not do so from an explicitly feminist perspective. 
The most promising example of a philosophical aesthetician who takes 
a consciously feminist perspective on natural beauty in his work is found in 
the work of Arnold Berleant. Berleant’s philosophical work takes experience 
and context seriously and his views of nature appreciators as participants in 
constructing the object of appreciation accords with much feminist think-
ing. And in much of his work, Berleant does incorporate various feminist 
insights into his environmental aesthetics, but one senses the promise of 
such insights is only beginning to be understood by him and his readers. So, 
although the surface has been scratched, even deeply by some, the depths 
of feminist thought in nature aesthetics have yet to be fully plumbed. even 
in my own work as a feminist philosopher who works on environmental 
aesthetics i have done little more than skim the surface of the ways feminist 
theory and environmental aesthetics might mutually inform one another. To 
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claim that feminist aesthetics has already paid ample attention to natural 
beauty is to sell feminist philosophy short. Moreover, even if it were the case 
that leopold, Berleant, and a few others were working in feminist aesthetics 
with a focus on natural beauty, which i don’t think is an accurate construal 
of the situation, this wouldn’t show that there isn’t presently a neglect of 
natural beauty by feminist aesthetics. in any case, there is certainly more 
to be said, more perspectives to take, and more issues to unearth than one 
small bunch of philosophers can accomplish.
iV.
Thus far i have argued that feminist aesthetics has neglected natural beauty 
as a topic of philosophical investigation and have explored various reasons 
for this neglect, none of which justifies it. in the process, i have also made 
some suggestions for issues on which feminist philosophers might wish to 
focus in environmental aesthetics. in closing, i would like to focus on the 
implications of this oversight. in his landmark essay, after outlining the 
neglect of the study of natural beauty, Hepburn argues as follows:
The neglect is a very bad thing: bad because aesthetics is thereby steered off 
from examining an important and richly complex set of relevant data; and 
bad because when a set of human experiences is ignored in a theory relevant 
to them, they tend to be rendered less available as experiences.23 
i am convinced that the neglect of natural beauty by feminist aesthet-
ics is a very bad thing; bad because it mutually impoverishes feminist and 
environmental aesthetics; bad because, as feminists are well aware, when 
an experience is not given voice, it is taken less seriously and perhaps com-
pletely erased. i believe feminists have much to offer by way of interpreta-
tion and reinterpretation of our aesthetic encounters in the natural world; 
these experiences and feminist insights are too important, too valuable, too 
complex, to be erased. 
When feminist aestheticians do not discuss natural beauty, environmen-
tal aesthetics misses out also on the edification feminist thought can bring. 
Feminist philosophy has enriched most areas of philosophy and environ-
mental aesthetics stands to benefit from the insights that can be gleaned 
from a feminist critique of its commitments, practices, and assumptions. in 
particular, precisely because feminist philosophers are so aware of and criti-
cal of the workings of assumed value dualisms, environmental aesthetics, 
which does make such assumptions in its workings can only benefit from the 
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increased self-awareness and increased self-critique that feminist perspec-
tives can engender. Without questioning these assumptions, one of which 
is basic in our field – the distinction between nature and culture – we might 
merely repeat past mistakes and fail to be as progressive as we would hope. 
Questioning these dualisms, such as that between nature and culture, doesn’t 
necessarily mean rejecting them, but it does necessarily mean understanding 
them better. Similarly, feminist aesthetics would be enriched by considering 
a broader scope of inquiry, considering anew how gender and other systems 
of power infiltrate our aesthetic experiences in the ‘natural’ world. 
in this essay, i have observed a serious neglect in environmental aes-
thetics, examined its causes, assessed some implications of the oversight, 
and reflected on the promise of bringing the neglected topic to the centre of 
issues in environmental aesthetics. Although it seems somewhat odd that it 
would be this area of philosophy – environmental aesthetics – that would 
be one of the last to fully embrace feminist perspectives and to benefit from 
all that feminism could offer by way of edification, insight, and education, 
i believe that the tensions that exist between feminism and aesthetics and 
feminism and nature can contribute to the importance of a feminist treatment 
of contemporary environmental aesthetics, for both feminism and aesthetics. 
Because aesthetics is necessarily interdisciplinary, and so too are feminist 
and environmental philosophy, failing to bring these fields to one another, in 
serious engagement, only impoverishes each from the insights these diverse, 
interdisciplinary fields can bring to one another. The reasons that help ex-
plain why feminist aesthetics may have neglected natural beauty offer ready 
research topics for feminist aestheticians who might wonder: How can a 
deeper, more serious, aesthetic appreciation of natural beauty be understood 
through feminist methodology? How can a more thorough investigation of 
the aesthetics of nature inform ecofeminism? How does disinterestedness 
differ as a regulative ideal in the artworld and in the aesthetic appreciation 
of nature? Should nature be appreciated aesthetically and what does that 
mean to a feminist anyway? How do race, gender and sexuality inform 
nature appreciation? How do these differences intersect in political debate 
over nature? is the concept of nature gendered? is women’s appreciation and 
nature writing due to women’s association with nature rather than culture? 
To my mind, feminist aestheticians should take up natural beauty as 
a topic of focus. The contemporary neglect of natural beauty by feminist 
philosophers is a gap that must be bridged. But now, i arrive as Hepburn 
did, at a bit of moralising and i take this, as he did, as ‘a sign that this paper 
has come to its proper end’.24 
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